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ABSTRACT
The unprecedented growth of the Internet
over the last years, and the expectation of an
even faster increase in the numbers of users and
networked systems, resulted in the Internet
assuming its position as a mass communication
medium. At the same time, the emergence of an
increasingly large number of application areas
and the evolution of the networking technology
suggest that in the near future the Internet may
become the single integrated communication
infrastructure. However, as the dependence on
the networking infrastructure grows, its security
becomes a major concern, in light of the
increased attempt to compromise the infra-
structure. In particular, the routing operation is
a highly visible target that must be shielded
against a wide range of attacks. The injection of
false routing information can easily degrade net-
work performance, or even cause denial of ser-
vice for a large number of hosts and networks
over a long period of time. Different approaches
have been proposed to secure the routing proto-
cols, with a variety of countermeasures, which,
nonetheless, have not eradicated the vulnerabili-
ty of the routing infrastructure. In this article, we
survey the up-to-date secure routing schemes
that appeared over the last few years. Our criti-
cal point of view and thorough review of the lit-
erature are an attempt to identify directions for
future research on an indeed difficult and still
largely open problem.
INTRODUCTION
Nowadays the Internet has hardly any resem-
blance to the early research-oriented network that
was designed to operate within a single domain of
trust and with practically no security mechanisms
in place. Through a 20-year process, the network
and its technological feats have matured, but so
have the threats to its proper operation. The dra-
matic expansion and commercialization of the
Internet rendered the network widely accessible,
blurred its boundaries, and opened it up to a wide
range of attacks. More important, the protocols
that are collectively identified as the TCP/IP
protocol suite were not designed with such a
hostile environment in mind. The exploitation of
their features and weaknesses, which came as no
surprise, led to the vast majority of the reported
security incidents.
The resultant growing security awareness of
the Internet community fueled an ongoing effort
to make the network a safer place for exchang-
ing information and conducting business. In
principle, the intended or already present securi-
ty services fall into two categories: data security,
which encompasses confidentiality, integrity, and
origin authentication; and access control, which
protects networked resources — hosts, servers,
and other networking devices such as bridges,
gateways, and routers — from unauthorized use.
Such services are supported by security protocols
operating at different layers of the protocol
stack, and provide, to a lesser or greater extent,
protection of user data. This is true even if the
medium is not secure by itself.
However, the problem of securing the net-
working infrastructure per se is in essence
orthogonal to securing the actual transfer of
information. An adversary could simply target
the infrastructure, instead of launching an attack
against the connection between any two securely
communicating ends; in fact, the latter would be
onerous if strong cryptography were appropri-
ately used. For example, by interfering with the
routing protocol, data may be redirected over
paths controlled by the attacker, or, even worse,
the use of incorrect connectivity information can
result in failure to have data delivered to a large
number of destinations. This way an attack
against a single element of the routing infra-
structure can cause a denial of service (DoS) for
a large portion of the user population. The rout-
ing protocol is an excellent target, not only
because severe network outages can be caused,
but also because this may not require a signifi-
cant effort in today’s absence of any form of
defense: “Abuse of the routing mechanisms and
protocols is probably the simplest protocol-based
attack available” [1].
The single most important vulnerability stems
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from the nature of the routing operation itself.
Routers (i.e., network devices dedicated to sup-
porting the routing functionality) have to acquire
global knowledge of the network topology. They
periodically exchange information with their
neighbors and gradually update their view (the
destinations they know how to reach). However,
in most cases routers are practically unable to
verify the correctness of the information they
receive from their peers. As a result, injected
false routing information would propagate
throughout the network, and it might remain in
use for arbitrarily long periods of time, thus
deceiving more than one routers. This way, an
attack at a single point of the network would
allow the adversary to exercise its control over
the network. The adversary could intercept data,
or, if user traffic were protected, obstruct the
data flows and even disable the network opera-
tion altogether.
This article addresses exactly this issue: how to
protect the routing infrastructure — in other words,
how to safeguard the topology discovery in the
presence of adversaries — so that authentic and
noncorrupted routing information can be acquired
in a timely manner. First, we provide a concise
overview of the Internet routing mechanism. Then
a classification of the possible threats and attacks
and an outline of the main directions to secure the
routing protocol are presented. We review the solu-
tions proposed in the literature to prevent the abuse
of the routing protocol, categorized according to
the type of underlying protocol. The schemes that
take the alternate approach to react to an attack
against the routing protocol, by first detecting and
then responding to it, are reviewed next, before our
discussion and conclusions.
OVERVIEW OF INTERNET ROUTING
The Internet comprises a large number of inter-
connected heterogeneous networks owned or
administered by different organizations. Exam-
ples of such management domains are the net-
worked resources of a university or corporate
campus, or an Internet service provider (ISP).
Within and between domains, which are called
autonomous systems (ASs), routers maintain an
up-to-date view of the network state. They peri-
odically exchange direct or indirect information:
direct, when a router advertises the addresses of
networks to which it is directly connected, or
indirect, when a router first processes the infor-
mation received from other routers before
advertising all the networks it knows how to
reach. In the former case, the router has more
or less a view of the entire network topology,
while in the latter case such knowledge is mini-
mal. The goal for any routing protocol is to
determine the “best” route to forward data to
their destinations.
These two fundamentally different design
approaches lend themselves to networking con-
texts with different characteristics. The multi-
tude of deployed routing protocols builds on
variations of either approach, and can be classi-
fied according to the organization of the Inter-
net, shown schematically in Fig. 1. Intra-AS or
intradomain or interior gateway protocols are
implemented by routers within an AS, while
inter-AS or interdomain or exterior gateway proto-
cols run on routers that exchange routing infor-
mation between domains and form the so-called
Internet backbone. The interior routers main-
tain a consistent map of AS connectivity and
provide a summary of the reachable destinations
to the outside world. Inversely, the backbone
provides information on reachable exterior des-
tinations to the interior routing protocol. Their
main difference is that intradomain protocols
choose the route that minimizes some metric,
such as distance, delay, or load, while interdo-
main protocols determine routes according to a
routing policy. A routing policy can be an arbi-
trary set of rules that determine, usually with
fairly complex criteria, which route advertise-
 Figure 1. Internet organization: the network is divided into interconnected autonomous systems, owned and administered by different
organizations.
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ments should be accepted as valid. For example,
it is common to have routers configured manu-
ally with hundreds of routes, ASs, or destina-
tions that are preferable to be included in a
route or reported to certain neighbors, accord-
ing to agreements among the interconnected
organizations.
Among a large number of protocols that have
been proposed and implemented, three proto-
cols have been widely deployed and evolved to
become the de facto standards for Internet rout-
ing: Routing Information Protocol (RIP), Open
Shortest Path First (OSPF), and Border Gateway
Protocol (BGP).1 In order to facilitate the discus-
sion in the rest of this article, we will briefly
overview the operation of each of these proto-
cols. RIP and OSPF are intradomain protocols,
and BGP is an interdomain protocol. Although
some security mechanisms are protocol-indepen-
dent, and security enhancements have been pro-
posed for other protocols as well, these three
have indeed received the most attention. Addi-
tionally, they are representative of different
types of routing algorithms, as briefly reviewed
below. The presentation of the security mecha-
nisms in a later section will follow the classifica-
tion according to the algorithm type as well.
RIP is a simple and widely deployed distance vec-
tor protocol appropriate for small networks with rel-
atively simple topology. Routers do not have explicit
knowledge of the network topology, but simply
exchange their view of the network condensed in
the form of the distance vector. This vector of the
minimum distances to all the networks that a router
knows how to reach is periodically passed to its
neighbors. As routers receive their neighbors’ vec-
tors, they update their own vectors. The used metric
is the hop count, and a network directly connected
to the router is at a one-hop distance, while an
unreachable network is 16 hops away, since the
maximum distance for RIP is 15 hops.
The basic idea of OSPF, a link-state routing
protocol, is that routers first discover their neigh-
bors and the state of their incident links, and then
communicate this information in link state adver-
tisement (LSA) messages. The LSAs are reliably
flooded throughout the network at fixed time
intervals, with the most recent LSA per originating
router relayed over each link exactly once. Even-
tually, all routers converge to the same complete
map of the network topology and calculate the
shortest paths to all other routers, using metrics
more complex than the hop count. The freshness
of an LSA is determined by its sequence number
and an age field. As routers relay LSAs, they modi-
fy the age field, so the removal of aging links is
synchronized throughout the network. A domain,
as shown in Fig. 2, is organized into areas, and the
flooding of LSAs does not cross area boundaries.
A set of area border routers (ABRs), which form
an intra-AS backbone, interconnect the areas, with
an AS boundary router (ASBR) connecting the AS
to the Internet backbone.
BGP is a path vector protocol; that is, the
routing information on reachable destinations
includes the corresponding path information.
The full sequence of the networks between the
source and destination allows BGP to detect
loops in a simple and effective manner: if an AS
is listed twice, a loop has occurred. The update
messages advertise new routes, or inform about
previously advertised routes that are not usable
anymore. As routers relay the updates, they
prepend their own AS identifier (AS numbers)
before passing the advertisement to their neigh-
bors. In addition, BGP allows the ranking of
routes according to preferences, including a met-
ric-based choice, although this is not implement-
ed in most cases. The plausibility of such sets of
rules and preferences (i.e., routing policies)
relies on the minimal expectation that routers
advertise routes they themselves use.
 Figure 2. Intradomain routing: ABRs connect areas to the AS backbone, and the ASBR connects the AS to the Internet.
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THREATS AND ROADMAP
Internet routing protocols may partially resist
faults and detect undesirable conditions, such
as “flapping” routes or links (i.e., routing infor-
mation that changes at an unexpectedly high
rate). In some cases, the protocol may also be
capable of resuming normal operation after the
removal of a faulty router. But such features do
not render routing protocols robust against
malicious attacks. Threats to the routing infra-
structure may emerge from practically any part
of the network; external attacks, mounted by a
node that does not participate in the routing
process, and internal attacks originating from a
device “trusted” to support the routing func-
tionality.
An internal attacker, which can be a compro-
mised or faulty router, may not comply with the
protocol by advertising false routing information
and making arbitrary routing decisions. It can
also tamper with the information originating
from other routers, by modifying, replaying, or
simply discarding it. As a result, a misbehaving
router can obstruct the routing operation
throughout a large part of the network.
An external attacker can acquire the topology
knowledge by eavesdropping and actively falsify
the routing information and the knowledge of
the network state by erasing, meaningfully alter-
ing, injecting, and replaying control and routing
traffic. It may also masquerade as a router and
try to obstruct the traffic flow by generating
floods of spurious messages or overloading
(“jamming”) a certain link or interface.
The impact of these attacks depends on a
multitude of factors, such as the employed
routing protocol, the point of attack, and the
presence of security countermeasures. Protocols
that pass aggregate routing information are
inherently less robust against false advertise-
ments than protocols that converge to a com-
plete network connectivity map. For the case of
distance vector protocols, it will not be long
before all routing tables are updated, so all
traffic is sent through the ill-behaved router
that simply advertises the “best” path to all des-
tinations. However, a misbehaving link state
router can lie easily only about the victim’s or
its own incident links. Even if this happens, a
legitimate router will have the chance to react
to the false information by flooding a fresher
correct update and have the false information
flushed by the rest of its peers.
In practice, careful configuration can pro-
tect routers from a number of false advertise-
ments. However, the requirement for “more
administration and more manual configura-
tion” results in a more complicated system, sig-
nificantly less dynamic, and more prone to
misconfiguration. More important, the routing
infrastructure remains vulnerable to attacks
that can bypass such defenses, when, for exam-
ple, the adversary is capable of masquerading
as a legitimate router or hijacking a connection
and tampering with the exchanged routing
information.
Cryptographic mechanisms can be a road-
block to such attacks by protecting the authen-
ticity and integrity of the routing traffic and by
providing the means to verify the authority of
the participating routers.  To achieve such
goals, routers should be able to present their
“credentials,” so their peers validate the
received information. The use of public key
cryptography and digital signatures is the best
way to do so, for different reasons, as will be
explained below. Each router is assumed to
have a unique identity and a pair of keys: a pri-
vate one used to generate signatures and a
public one used by the rest of the routers to
validate them. As a result, the origin of routing
information can be verified, message tampering
can be detected, and the authorization of a
node to participate in the routing process can
be proven.
The cornerstone of such mechanisms is the
presence of a public key infrastructure (PKI), a
trusted facility that certifies and distributes the
public keys of the routers throughout the net-
work. The surveyed schemes assume an initial
distribution of credentials, propose a simple pro-
tocol for the same task (e.g., each router floods
its public key), or even define in detail the struc-
ture of the PKI. The use of public key cryptogra-
phy, instead of the establishment of pairwise
security associations, appears as an appropriate
choice: the originator of a routing message may
not know its possible recipients and thus be
unable to select which shared keys to use. Addi-
tionally, it may be required that routing informa-
tion cannot be repudiated, in order to facilitate
the detection of misbehaving routers. Note that
the mere disclosure of the routing information
does not inflict harm on network operation, and
the use of encryption is not proposed in most
cases.2
The use of symmetric key cryptography
would be useful to protect traffic exchanged
between neighbors, as shown in Fig. 3, by mes-
 Figure 3. Authentication of routing information exchanged between two adjacent routers.
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sage authentication codes (MACs) [3]. Such an
approach entails more complex key manage-
ment and cannot provide nonrepudiation, but
it is far less computationally expensive than the
public key digital signatures. It can provide
authentication and integrity protection on a
link basis, and complement naturally the PKI-
based mechanisms. All the schemes discussed
below assume, unless otherwise stated, the
presence of an authorization structure and a
PKI so that the authority of a router to adver-
tise specific information and its role are deter-
mined. Unless explained otherwise, for the rest
of the discussion, a certificate binds the public
key of each router to its  identity,  and all
routers are equipped with the certificates of
their peers.
PREVENTIVE SECURITY MECHANISMS
In this section we survey the security enhance-
ments that have been proposed in the literature.
Before proceeding, we should note that the
implementations of all current routing protocols,
including RIP, OSPF, and BGP, support clear
text password authentication. However, clear
text passwords can easily be captured by an
adversary, despite the additional assurances pro-
vided by specialized password authentication sys-
tems. The use of keyed hash functions and
MACs is an apparent improvement, which has
gained increased support by router vendors as
an important line of defense to protect the rout-
ing traffic exchanged between adjacent routers.
Both RIP and OSPF have been extended to sup-
port keyed MD5 authentication, and BGP
updates can be protected by a password-based
MD5 digest TCP option. However, these mea-
sures cannot stop rogue advertisements once
they are injected in the network, and they do not
allow the tracking of the incorrect routing infor-
mation source. These additional assurances are
the goal of some of the schemes we survey below.
DISTANCE VECTOR PROTOCOLS
The use of digitally signed updates and signifi-
cant modifications to the distance vector func-
tionality have been proposed [4]. Routers pass
the address of the predecessor network (i.e., the
last hop before the advertised destination) and
also inform their neighbors of changes in their
incident links. Updates include the identity of
the originating router and a sequence number so
that their authenticity and freshness can be vali-
dated. To validate an update, the protocol steps
backward through the recorded predecessors for
all destinations, starting from the destination
and the reported predecessor. If this succession
of links leads back to the router that now checks
the update, the advertisement is accepted as cor-
rect. However, the update signature does not
cover the distance metrics, and virtually any dis-
tance other than hop count can be advertised by
a misbehaving router. The correctness of the
routing operation is achieved under the assump-
tion that a rogue router will not lie about its
incident links. Nevertheless, in practice, a misbe-
having router might attract traffic if it systemati-
cally corrupted the distance metrics, including its
incident link lengths.
LINK STATE PROTOCOLS
The use of digital signatures differs significantly
when the targeted protocol is a link state one.
The originating router signs the LSA, which is
validated by its peers before they relay it.
According to the robust flooding technique [5],
the sequence numbers of valid updates are com-
pared to the ones stored locally. If the newly
received number is equal to or larger than the
one corresponding to the origin of the LSA, the
router updates its stored value and forwards the
advertisement. Otherwise, it transmits its own
up-to-date value to the neighbor that relayed the
obsolete advertisement. Ties, which could occur
if, for example, the originating router crashed
and lost its state, are broken by the numerical
values of the signatures. All control traffic is
acknowledged on a link basis, by copying the sig-
nature and the sequence number of the LSA.
Although corrective actions such as retransmis-
sions are taken in case of failures, this type of
acknowledgment does not provide any guarantee
as to which node responded. However, as long
as a single route, free of subverted routers, exists
for each pair of routers, the delivery of genuine
LSAs will be possible.
The securing of OSPF takes a similar
approach; the signature of the originating
router remains attached to the LSA as it propa-
gates throughout the network, in order to
authenticate the source of the LSA, protecting
the provided information and thus its timeliness
[6]. The scheme proposes five new types of
LSAs with modified headers carrying the signa-
ture, plus a sixth message type for distribution
of the public keys throughout the AS. Its scope
does not exceed the limits of the area and the
AS, since misbehaving ASBRs or ABRs can
still inject incorrect routing information. Anoth-
er way to disrupt the protocol would be to tam-
per with the age field of the LSAs, which is not
covered by the signature: an adversary could
gradually increment the age of legitimate
updates and force correct link state to be
flushed as obsolete.
The large numbers of signed LSAs that need
to be validated and generated is an important
limiting factor for securing link state protocols.
The computational overhead depends on the
network size and topology, but the situation
could become very difficult when handling the
announcement of exterior routes within the AS.
It is thus straightforward to attempt to provide a
low-cost signature mechanism. The idea in [7] is
to have each router commit to a hash chain, a
long precomputed sequence of values that the
router provably generated. The hash chain is cal-
culated by the successive operation of a hash
function [8, 9] on a random value. Then the
router uses one chain element, indexed on the
time of the update, per generated link state
update so that receiving routers verify its validity
in a computationally inexpensive manner. As
illustrated in Fig. 4, they apply the same hash
function on the newly received update and the
current timestamp, and then compare against
the initial commitment or previously validated
element.
The scheme assumes that link states are
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advertised only periodically, and relies on loosely
synchronized clocks. In particular, if the maxi-
mum clock drift does not exceed two advertise-
ment periods, the adversary cannot cause a
forged message to be accepted as genuine and
fresh. However, the advantage of link state pro-
tocols to use complex routing metrics would be
abolished, since the scheme calculates one hash
chain per up or down state for each incident
link. The use of a multivalued metric requires
the generation of one chain per value, thus
imposing significant overhead. Most of these
chain elements would remain unused, while fre-
quent link state changes or short update periods
would require frequent generation and commit-
ment to new chains. Under these conditions, the
scheme may not be plausible and, as the authors
suggest, an asymmetric cryptography scheme
might be more efficient.
A different approach to reduce the cost of
authenticating LSAs proposes to use the ele-
ments of a hash chain not as authenticators but
as keys for the generation of MACs attached to
each LSA [10]. The reduction of cost is
achieved by deferring the validation of LSAs
until reception of the corresponding key, which
is flooded by the originating router at designat-
ed times. The protocol assumes synchronized
clocks and bounded maximum transmission
delay over any network path. All LSAs have to
be sent within a sufficiently short period before
the release of the key with which they were
signed. Then, no forged advertisement will be
accepted during the a posteriori validation.
However, the longer the key release period, the
higher the vulnerability of the protocol. LSAs
update the network map, although they cannot
be immediately validated and may be forged.
As a result, the use of such false routing infor-
mation can degrade the protocol operation. In
essence, the scheme provides low-cost authenti-
cation at the expense of restrictive timing
assumptions and low assurances, since it
assumes that attacks against the protocol will
be infrequent and countered by disconnection
of the misbehaving router.
A solution to the vulnerability of the two
above-mentioned schemes to “delay and forge”
attacks is given by a protocol that uses one-time
signatures to sign routing updates [11]. The pro-
posed protocol removes the correlation between
successive keys, by “enclosing” the public key for
the validation of the (i + 1)st message signature
inside the ith message. A router chooses at ran-
dom one-time secret and public key components,
and initially digitally signs and distributes the
hash value of the public components. Then each
signed message carries the hashed value of the
public key components for the following mes-
sage, and it is validated according to the public
key carried by the previous message. However, a
message loss implies that the commitment to the
initial one-time public key has to be redone with
conventional public key cryptography. As a
result, the protocol would retain its efficiency
only when all messages are received. Additional-
ly, the relatively large size of the signature and
the resultant transmission overhead might be a
limiting factor, especially because of the small
size of LSA packets.
PATH VECTOR PROTOCOLS
The securing of BGP and path vector protocols
requires the protection of the path to the desti-
nation along with the advertised information. It
has been proposed to secure BGP by having the
advertising router identify its immediately pre-
ceding AS, as an additional attribute covered by
the signature. This technique is similar to the
one discussed earlier: routers maintain a prede-
cessor database with all the validated predeces-
sor links, and verify the authenticity of the path
by stepping back from the destination and its
predecessor, through the database, until the
entire path is either validated of rejected [2].
However, it is restrictive to assume that an AS
on the path would also be a destination; for
example, it is possible that an AS is transit-only
for specific endpoints. Then a valid path could
be rejected because of a missing adjacency, or
data would not be delivered for a certain source
and destination although the path was deemed
valid. Such problems occur because of the com-
plicated BGP routing policies that appear to be
the usual case, instead of a shortest-path policy.
Additionally, the modification of the route of an
in-transit update is possible, since the digital sig-
nature protects only the predecessor and the
destination.
This can be avoided if each router passes the
advertisement only after it appends its signature
covering the entire path [12]. As advertisements
propagate further away from their origin, nested
signatures are accumulated, with each signature
covering the previous one and the destination.
This is necessary so that no router can detach a
part of the route and the associated signatures
and pass them as proof of path authenticity.
 Figure 4. Use of the hash chain to authenticate link state updates. Router A selects a random value RA,j
for its jth incident link, and calculates the hash chain Hn(RA,j) = H(Hn-1(RA,j)), with H0(RA,j) = RA,j.
Its peers initially receive Hn(RA,j) digitally signed by A. At time interval Ti, Hn-i(RA,j) is released by router
A to authenticate the advertised state of link (A, j). Each receiving router has some previously validated
link state LSp, that is, Hp(RA,j) from interval Tp. If a change is reported (e.g., at Tp the link was "down"
and now, at Ti it is "up"), the link state is deemed authentic if Hi(LSi) is equal to Hn(RA,j). If no change is
reported, LSp is compared to Hi-p(LSi).
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However, a router can insert itself into the path,
when it propagates an advertisement and the
corresponding path, without being authorized to
do so.
The issue of determining the authority of
routers to advertise network prefixes or routes is
addressed by a scheme based on two PKIs. One
certifies the ownership of the address space
granted to each organization, and the second
certifies the identities of the ASs and their BGP
routers [13]. The authorization of an AS to
advertise a block of addresses can be verified
since a certificate binds address blocks to specif-
ic public keys. Moreover, the authentication of
BGP routers, ASs, and the relationship between
routers and ASs is possible as well. Routers can
verify the ownership of an AS number by an
organization, the identity of an AS, and the
identity of a BGP router. With this hierarchy of
certificates at hand, signatures, called address
attestations and route attestations, are applied on
each update message in a manner similar to the
above-mentioned nested signatures. Each route
attestation, added by one BGP router along the
route, covers the organization identifier and the
entire subpath, from the predecessor of the
router that makes the attestation to the adver-
tised destination.
REACTIVE SECURITY MECHANISMS
Despite the use of preventive security mecha-
nisms, it is always possible that attackers defeat
or bypass the security countermeasures, or sim-
ply target one of the unprotected components
of the system. In order to provide an in-depth
defense, security measures should be comple-
mented by tools that could detect an attack
while it is still underway, and possibly identify
its source, so the misbehaving devices are iso-
lated. This approach could be valuable for the
protection of the routing infrastructure as well.
The schemes surveyed in an earlier section
defend the infrastructure against external
attacks, but they leave ample space for internal
attacks.
In order to be able to identify an attack, the
behavior of the attacker (i.e., the rogue router)
has to be noticeably different from that of a
well-behaving router. This is the basis of intru-
sion detection systems (IDSs), which have been
widely applied for the protection of computing
systems and networked environments by detect-
ing anomalies or misuse patterns.3 In order to
transcribe such techniques onto the routing con-
text, a precise definition of what constitutes nor-
mal behavior for a router is needed, especially in
terms of route discovery. Or inversely, it is
important to define what an IDS-inspired system
should look for before producing a misbehavior
alarm.
A network IDS that aims to protect the
OSPF routing protocol proposes the use of a
combination of countermeasures in order to
detect attacks [16]. The system tries to charac-
terize the current network from sequences of
protocol-related events it tries to correlate with
known attacks. Each attack is specified by a
finite state machine, and an alarm is triggered
by a specific sequence of transitions caused by
events related to the content of the received
LSAs or other control traffic. In addition, a set
of static rules used to discard erroneous control
traffic and a statistical inference tool comple-
ment the system. These rules are used to
increase the chances of intrusion detection. The
analysis of the time-related behavior of the
routing protocol, the close monitoring of the
routers, and the detailed specification of known
attacks are the primary weapons of this
approach, whose effectiveness, especially in the
case of OSPF, is aided by the fact that a suc-
cessful attack should be persistent and thus is
easier to identify.
A different approach uses the data forward-
ing operation as a proxy for identifying whether
a router is faulty or compromised [17, 18]. The
basic idea is that nonfaulty routers execute a
protocol to test their peers and, in essence, ver-
ify whether each packet routed over the tested
router is appropriately forwarded. Then the
router is deemed nonfaulty. The testing router
probes its neighbors by sending packets
addressed to one of its own ports. Under the
assumption that the tested router will see the
same point-to-point link as the least cost path
back to the testing router, a returned packet
implies that the test was successful. Of course,
it is also required that the tested router be
unable to detect the probe packet (e.g., deter-
mine that the destination IP address corre-
sponds to one of the interfaces of the source
router). Otherwise, it could selectively respond
to probes and misbehave with the rest of data
and control traffic.
A more elaborate scheme proposed by the
same authors relies on traffic analysis and the
principle of conservation of traffic. It is assumed
that the number of packets arriving at a router
equals the sum of outbound traffic plus the num-
ber of packets destined for the router, or a net-
work directly connected to the router. A router
that violates this condition is considered misbe-
having. To detect such misbehavior, each router
continuously updates traffic counters for the
three categories of packets per neighbor and
direction of communication (incoming/outgo-
ing): in-transit packets, packets destined to the
router/neighbor, and packets originating from
the neighbor/router. Moreover, routers are
assumed capable of counting the number of
packets their neighbors misrouted (i.e., routed
over a suboptimal path). At any instance, a
router can initiate the protocol by flooding a
request, and wait until at least the majority of
the routers respond with a request. Then, the
contents of the traffic counters are exchanged
among the routers within their three-hop neigh-
borhood, and the flow conservation tests are
performed. Nevertheless, these protocols may be
of limited practicality, relying on very strong
assumptions that are almost impossible to satisfy
in practical networks, even if a link state proto-
col is used. For example, counting misrouted
packets requires that a testing router have copies
of the routing tables of all its neighbors, a well
behaved router never drops packets, all routers
have knowledge of exactly the same network
state, and each pair of well-behaved routers is
connected.
3 An intrusion detection
system was first intro-
duced in [14]. For an
overview, see [15].
In order to
provide an
in-depth defense,
security measures
should be
complemented by
tools that could
detect an attack
while it is still
underway, and
possibly identify
its source, so the
misbehaving
devices are
isolated. This
approach could
be valuable for
the protection of
the routing
infrastructure
as well.
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
The solution space of an already difficult prob-
lem — how to secure the Internet routing infra-
structure — is further constrained by the wide
deployment of diverse protocols and systems.
Security measures will have to be retrofitted to
existing protocols, as becomes clear from many
of the surveyed proposals. However, basic pro-
tocol mechanisms, or their absence, may disal-
low the provision of a security service; for
example, BGP does not use sequence numbers
to identify updates; thus, the secure version of
the protocol cannot rely on such a feature to
provide replay protection [13]. At the same
time, protocol features, such as the real-time
advertisement of exterior routes to all interior
OSPF routers, may be responsible for excessive
computational cost, even under normal opera-
tion conditions. Both examples indicate that as
protocols evolve, it would be reasonable to
expect that modifications may be driven by
security considerations as well.
Nevertheless, the operational requirements of
the protocol appear to be the primary factor that
will determine the plausibility of deploying effec-
tive security enhancements. Although Moore’s
Law ensures that cryptographic operations grad-
ually become inexpensive, the increasing net-
work size and connectivity, and the dynamically
varying network state counterbalance such bene-
fits. The rate of cryptographic operations pri-
marily depends on the rate of topology changes
and the topology itself. The number of routers,
their connectivity, the placing of a router in the
network, the size of the interconnected subnets,
and the speed of links are all critical factors
determining the performance overhead. In order
to assess the feasibility of the proposed security
measures, detailed protocol-specific studies are
required, as was done, for example, with secure
BGP [19].
An additional important factor, which has
been underrated, is the cost of reconfiguration,
especially as a means to deal with accidental sit-
uations such as a router crash. The rebooted
device would have to be updated with the keys
of its peers, and, especially for protocols that
replicate functionality and processing, re-acquire
knowledge of entire network state. For example,
for OSPF this state will be the entire “link
database”; that is, link metrics and ages,
sequence numbers, and, for BGP, the complete
routing tables of all other “speakers” — the
backbone routers. Upon receipt, this volume of
data has to be validated before the router
resumes operation.
Abnormal conditions or denial of service
attacks are yet another factor that has to be con-
sidered, especially in conjunction with the
expected high operational cost of security mea-
sures. It is necessary to cope with seemingly
legitimate control traffic that may arrive at over-
whelmingly high rates, so the apparent benefits
from cryptographically powered schemes are not
waived under adverse situations. Otherwise, the
infrastructure would become an ideal target for
denial of service attacks, which transmit at inter-
vals comparable to the processing delay of a sin-
gle update validation. The solution to such
vulnerability appears to be careful configuration
of the protocol suites by disabling some of their
features. In addition, tools that filter out spuri-
ous traffic, bound the rate of incoming control
traffic, and limit the area affected by such attacks
should be used. Nevertheless, the combined
effect of such an approach can only be comple-
mentary, and it may have a premium on the
dynamic nature of routing.
The dynamically changing state of the net-
work can be a major roadblock to efforts that
attempt to detect intrusions by observing the
packet forwarding. Apart from the previously
discussed impractical aspects (e.g., the assump-
tion that packet loss is only due to malicious
behavior), intrusion detection schemes may be of
limited value when the routing protocol is
abused. A router can be made to appear to mis-
behave because of intentionally nonoptimal rout-
ing information. This is possible even when
routers do not have the same view of the topolo-
gy, since packets are counted as misrouted when
they deviate from the optimal path. Similarly,
the testable links and routers can be incorrectly
determined when false link costs are injected.
However, under a set of realistic assumptions,
the design of protocol-specific tools appears to
be a desired extension of secure routing proto-
cols, but only when it is combined with other
security enhancements. Otherwise, an attacker
capable of injecting false routing information
can at least mislead the IDS algorithm, especial-
ly when repudiation is possible.
This naturally brings up the issue of handling
a misbehavior alarm, especially when it may be
false. Apart from the obvious solution of an
overlooking central management entity, it is nec-
essary to investigate the practicality of schemes
that could reach a consensus about the detection
of a faulty router. However, this may increase
the delays of intrusion detection while the under-
going attack affects the network. In general, the
cost of relying on IDS instead of preventive
security mechanisms can be significant, and the
claim that IDS could be an alternative to the, in
some cases, prohibitively costly security enhance-
ments should be revisited.
Moreover, the cost of employing a mecha-
nism cannot be considered independent of the
cost (impact) of a successful attack. Since attacks
may become increasingly frequent, the cost of
sustaining an attack until its detection will
become more significant, depending on the abili-
ty of the detection mechanism to identify the
ongoing attack. The design and evaluation of
such mechanisms will be more challenging when
attacks are not persistent, but almost random,
and thus difficult to detect. Even though the
resultant outages may not be severe, in the sense
that not very high percentages of packets are
lost, they may have a significant impact on the
quality of service of some sensitive applications.
In other words, an adversary may trade off effec-
tiveness for a less visible attack.
As the necessity to secure the routing infra-
structure grows, it becomes apparent that secu-
rity enhancements should be globally present.
To this extent, the Internet security architecture
(IPsec) [20] can provide authentication, integri-
ty, replay detection, and encryption to protect
Under a set
of realistic
assumptions,
the design of
protocol-specific
tools appears to
be a desired
extension of
secure routing
protocols, but
only when it is
combined with
other security
enhancements. 
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routing protocol traffic. The global deployment
of IPsec protocols will provide a set of powerful
tools that would seamlessly interoperate
throughout the Internet, under the assumption
that the next generation of IP, IPv6, is also
globally present. However, the mere provision
of such services cannot secure the routing pro-
tocol itself; IPsec can deter external attacks and
disallow the injection of unauthorized routing
traffic by securing the point-to-point exchange
of routing updates at the network layer, but can-
not enforce or guarantee correct operation of
the routing protocol under an internal attack.
The satisfaction of the security requirements for
each of the deployed protocols is a task that will
be undertaken by either schemes such as those
surveyed in this article or their successors.
These future protocols will have to provide a
solution to the most basic, but still unsolved,
problem of protecting against false routing
information.
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